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THE JUDICIARY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
A CRITIQUE
David Gray Adler*
The unmistakable trend toward executive domination of U.S. foreign
affairs in the past sixty years re presents a dramatic departure from the
basic scheme of the Constitution. The constitutional blueprint assigns to
Congress senior status in a partnership with the President to conduct
foreign policy. It also gives Congress the sole and exclusive authority
over the ultimate foreign relations power: the authority to initiate war.
The President is vested with modest authority in this realm and is clearly
only of secondary importance. In light of this constitutional design,
commentators have wondered at the causes and sources of this radical
shift in foreign affairs powers from Congress to the President.
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Although a satisfactory explanation for the radical shift in power is
perhaps elusive, the growth of presidential power in foreign relations has
fed considerably on judicial decisions that are doubtful and fragile. An
exhaustive explanation, which has so far escaped the effort of others, is
beyond the scope of this article. The aim of the first section is to examine
the judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in the area of foreign
affairs as manifested in Supreme Court rulings regarding executive
agreements, travel abroad, the war power, and treaty termination.
In the second section of this article, I provide a brief explanation of
the policy underlying the Constitutional Convention's allocation of
* Department of Political Science, Idaho State University
1 For a discussion of this trend from a sharply critical perspective, see DAVID GRAY
ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES (1986) [hereinafter
ADLER, TERMINATION]; Adler, The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking, POLITICAL
SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Spring 1988 at 103 [hereinafter Adler, Warmaking]; RAOUL B.
ERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974) [hereinafter BERGER];
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH
& EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR: THE WAR POWER OF CONGRESS IN
HISTORY AND LAW (1986); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995).
2 For differing explanations, see Ira Katznelson & Kenneth Prewitt, Constitutionalism,
Class and the Limits of Choice in U.S. Foreign Policy, in CAPITALISM AND STATE IN
U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 25 (Richard Fagan ed., 1979); THEODORE LOWI, THE
PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985); PHILIP
KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1978); LESLIE GELB & RICHARD
BETTS, THE IRONY OF VIETNAM: THE SYSTEM WORKED (1979). See also authors cited
supra note 1.
foreign affairs powers and argue that those values are as relevant and
compelling today as they were two centuries ago. In the third section, I
contend that a wide gulf has developed in the past fifty years between
constitutional theory and governmental practice in the conduct of foreign
policy. The Court has greatly facilitated the growth of presidential power
in foreign affairs in three interconnected but somewhat different ways by:
(1) adhering to the sole-organ doctrine as propounded in the 1036 case of
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., (2) invoking the political
question doctrine and other nonjusticiable grounds, and (3) inferring
congressional approval of presidential action by virtue of congressional
inaction or silence.3 I then offer an explanation of the Court's willingness
to increase presidential foreign affairs powers well beyond constitutional
boundaries. For a variety of reasons, the Court views its role in this area
as a support function for policies already established. In this regard the
judiciary has become an arm of the executive branch. Finally, I conclude
with the argument that to maintain the integrity of the Constitution, the
Court must police constitutional boundaries to ensure that fundamental
alterations in our governmental system will occur only through the
process of constitutional amendment. The judicial branch may not
abdicate its function "to say what the law is."
4
The Constitution and the Conduct of Foreign Policy
The Constitution envisions the conduct of foreign policy as a
partnership between the President and Congress. Perhaps surprisingly,
the Constitution assigns Congress the role of senior partner. This
assignment reflects, first, the overwhelming preference of both the
framers at the Constitutional Convention and the ratifiers in state
conventions for collective decision-making in both foreign and domestic
affairs. Second, this assignment of powers reflects their equally adamant
opposition to unilateral executive control of U.S. foreign policy. This
constitutional arrangement is evidenced by specific, unambiguous textual
language, almost undisputed arguments by framers and ratifiers, and by
logical-structural inferences from the doctrine of separation of powers.
5
The constitutional assignment of powers, moreover, is compelling and
relevant for twentieth century America for at least three reasons. First,
separation of powers issues are perennial, for they require consideration
of the proper repository of power. Contemporary questions about the
allocation of power between the President and Congress in foreign affairs
are largely the same as those addressed two centuries ago. Second, the
logic of collective decisionmaking in the realm of foreign relations is as
3 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
4 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
5 See ADLER, TERMINATION, supra note 1, at 84-148.
sound today as it was in the founding period. Third, although the world
and the role of the United States in international relations have changed
considerably over the past 200 years, most questions of foreign affairs
still involve routine policy formulation and do not place a premium on
immediate responsive action.
The preference for collective, rather than individual, decisionmaking
runs throughout those provisions of the Constitution that govern the
conduct of foreign policy. Congress, as a collective governing body,
derives broad and exclusive powers from Article I to regulate foreign
commerce and to initiate all hostilities on behalf of the United States,
including war. As Article II indicates, the President shares with the
Senate the treaty-making power and the power to appoint ambassadors.
Only two powers in foreign relations are assigned exclusively to the
President. First, he is commander-in-chief, but he acts in this capacity by
and under the authority of Congress. As Alexander Hamilton and James
Iredell argued, the President, in this capacity, is merely first admiral or
general of the armed forces, after war has been authorized by Congress or
in the event of a sudden attack against the United States. 6 Secondly, the
President has the power to receive ambassadors. Hamilton, James
Madison, and Thomas Jefferson agreed that this clerk-like function was
purely ceremonial in character. Although this function has come to entail
recognition of states at international law, which carries with it certain
legal implications, this founding trio contended that the duty of
recognizing states was more conveniently placed in the hands of the
executive than in the legislature. 7 These two powers exhaust the textual
grant of authority to the President regarding foreign affairs jurisdiction.
The President's constitutional authority pales in comparison to the powers
of Congress.
This Constitutional preference for shared decisionmaking is
emphasized again in the construction of the shared treaty power: "He
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."8 The
compelling simplicity and clarity of the plain words of this clause leave
no room to doubt its meaning. 9 There is no other clause that even
6 For a discussion of the commander-in-chief clause, see Adler, Warmaking, supra note
1, at 8-13; BERGER, supra note 1, at 60-64.
7 See Hamilton's explanation in THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Edward M. Earle ed., 1937). Madison's remarks may be found in THE LETTERS OF
PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS 76-77 (Richard Loss ed., 1976). See Adler, The President's
Recognition Power, 25 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 267 (Spring 1995).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
9 Such a straight-forward, textualist approach provides a basis which, in the words of
Professor Philip Bobbit, is readily apprehendable by the people at large, namely, given
common-language meaning to constitutional provisions. PHILIP BOBBITT,
intimates a presidential power to make agreements with foreign nations.
Therefore, as Hamilton argued, the treaty power constitutes the principal
vehicle for conducting U.S. foreign relations.' 0 In fact, there was no hint
at the Constitutional Convention of an exclusive Presidential power to
make foreign policy. To the contrary, all the arguments of the framers and
ratifiers were to the effect that the Senate and President, which Hamilton
and Madison described as a "fourth branch of government" in their
capacity as treaty maker, 11 are to manage concerns with foreign nations.12
While a number of factors contributed to this decision, 13 the pervasive
fear of unbridled executive power loomed largest. 14 Hamilton's statement
fairly represents these sentiments:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted
opinion of human nature which would make it wise in a
nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a
kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of
the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 31 (1982). The significance of the plain meaning of the words
should not be underestimated. As Justice Joseph Story observed,
Constitutions ... are instruments of a particular nature, founded on the
common business of human life, adapted to common wants, designed
for common use, and fitted for common understanding. The people
make them; the people adopt them; the people must be supposed to read
them . . . and cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite
meaning.
Id. at 25-26.
10 THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
11 ADLER, TERMINATION, supra note 1, at 93.
12 For similar remarks, see id. at 291, 323. Senator Rufus King, one of the framers, stated
in Congress in 1818 that, "To the validity of all ... proceedings in the management of
foreign affairs; the constitutional advice and consent of the Senate are indipensable." 31
ANNALS OF CONG. 106-07 (1818). See also ADLER, TERMINATION, supra note 1, at 84-
148.
13 For example, it was argued in the Constitutional Convention that the various political,
economic, and security interests of the states could be protected only if each state had an
equal voice in the treaty-making process. See ADLER, TERMINATION, supra note 1, at 84-
88.
14 In the North Carolina Ratifying Convention, William Davie, one of the framers,
indicated that the jealousy of executive power, which has shown itself so strongly in all
the American governments, would not admit of lodging the treaty powers in the President
along. 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 120 (2d ed. 1836). In order to allay fears that
the Convention had created an embryonic monarchy, Hamilton launched into a minute
analysis of presidential power in The Federalist No. 69, and advised that nothing was to
be feared from an executive with the confined authorities of the President. Fear of a
return of Executive authority like that exercised by the Royal Governors or by the King
had been ever present in the States from the beginning of the Revolution. CHARLES
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 173 (1947).
circumstanced as would be a President of the United
States.15
The widespread fear of executive power that precluded presidential
control of foreign policy also greatly influenced the Convention's design
of the War Clause. Article I, section 8, paragraph 11 states: "The
Congress shall have Power ... To declare War."'16 The plain meaning of
the clause is buttressed by the unanimous agreement among both framers
and ratifiers that Congress was granted the sole and exclusive authority to
initiate war. The warmaking power, which was viewed as a legislative
power by Madison and Wilson, among others, was specifically withheld
from the President. 17  James Wilson, second only to Madison as an
architect of the Constitution, summed up the values and concerns
underlying the war clause for the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to
guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single body
of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important
power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.
This declaration must be made with the concurrence of the
House of Representatives; from this circumstance we may
draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national
interest can draw us into war.18
No member of the Constitutional Convention and no member of any state
ratifying convention ever attributed a different meaning to the War
Clause. 19
15 THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward M. Earle ed., 1937).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 11.
17 When the framers were discussing the repository of the war power, they considered a
proposal to give the national executive the executive powers of the Continental Congress.
But concern was expressed that this power would include the power of war, which would
make the executive a monarchy. James Wilson sought to allay such concerns in stating,
"Making peace and war are generally determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to
be legislative powers." He added that "the Prerogatives of the British Monarchy" are not
"a proper guide in defining the executive powers. Some of the prerogatives were of a
legislative nature. Among others that of war and peace." 1 MAX FARRAND, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 65-66, 73-74 (1911). Madison agreed
with Wilson. See id. at 70. For discussion of the allocation of the war power and the
President's authority to repel attacks against the United States, see Adler, Warmaking,
supra note 1, at 3-13.
18 ELLIOT, supra note 14, vol. 2, at 528.
19 For statements in the state ratifying conventions, see Adler, Warmaking, supra note 1,
at 5. For example, James Iredell stated in North Carolina, "The President has not the
power of declaring war by his own authority... Those powers are vested in other hands.
The power of declaring war is expressly given to Congress." And Charles Pickney, a
delegate in Philadelphia, told the South Carolina Ratifying Convention that the
President's powers did not permit him to declare war. ELLIOT, supra note 14, vol. 4, at
This undisputed interpretation draws further support from early
judicial decisions, the views of eminent treatise writers, and from
nineteenth-century practice. I have discussed these factors elsewhere;
here the barest review must suffice. 20 The meaning of the War Clause
was put beyond doubt by several early judicial decisions. No court since
has departed from this early view. In 1800, in Bas v. Tingy, the Supreme
Court held that it is for Congress alone to declare either an "imperfect"
(limited) war or a "perfect" (general) war.21  In 1801, in Talbot v.
Seeman, Chief Justice John Marshall, a member of the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, stated that the "whole powers of war [are], by the
Constitution of the United States, vested in [C]ongress...." 22 In Little v.
Barreme, decided in 1804, Marshall concluded that President John
Adams' instructions to seize ships were in conflict with an act of
Congress and were therefore illegal.23 In 1806, in United States v. Smith,
the question of whether the President may initiate hostilities was decided
by Justice William Paterson, riding circuit, who wrote for himself and
District Judge Tallmadge: "Does he [the President] possess the power of
making war? That power is exclusively vested in Congress ... It is the
exclusive province of Congress to change a state of peace into a state of
war.",24 In 1863, the Prize Cases presented the Court with its first
opportunity to consider the power of the President to respond to sudden
attacks.25 Justice Robert C. Grier delivered the opinion of the Court:
By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to
declare a natural or foreign war ... If a war be made by
invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force, by force. He does not
initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority. And
whether the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States
organized in rebellion, it is none the less a war, although
the declaration of it be "unilateral. 26
These judicial decisions established the constitutional fact that it is for
Congress alone to initiate hostilities, whether in the form of general or
107, 108, 287. Hamilton, moreover, had stated flatly that "the declaring of war ... by
the Constitution... would appertain to the legislature." THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 448.
20 See Adler, Warmaking, supra note 1, at 3-29.
21Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 378 (1800).
22 Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
23 Little v. Barreme, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-43, 45-46 (1800); 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28
(1801); 2 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804).
24 United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192,1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16342).
25 Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863).
26 [d.
limited war; the President, in his capacity as commander-in-chief, is
granted only the power to repel sudden attacks against the United States.
27
The Convention's attachment to collective judgment and its decision to
create a structure of shared power in foreign affairs provided, in the words
of Wilson, "a security to the people," for it was a cardinal tenet of
republican ideology that the conjoined wisdom of many is superior to that
of one.28 The emphasis on group decisionmaking came, of course, at the
expense of unilateral executive authority. This hardly posed a difficult
choice, however; for the framers and ratifiers held a pervasive distrust of
executive power, a deeply held suspicion that dated to colonial times.
29
As a result of this aversion to executive authority, the Convention placed
control of foreign policy beyond the unilateral capacity of the President.
Furthermore, as Madison said, the Convention "defined and confined" the
authority of the President so that a power not granted could not be
assumed.30
The structure of shared powers in foreign relations serves to deter
abuse of power, misguided policies, irrational action, and unaccountable
behavior. 3 1 As a fundamental matter, emphasis on joint policymaking
permits the airing of sundry political, social, and economic values and
concerns. Such a structure wisely ensures that the ultimate policies will
not merely reflect the private preferences or the short-term political
interests of the President. 3
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OFFICE AND POWERS 4 (3d ed., N.Y. Univ. Press 1948).
32 FARRAND, supra note 17, vol. 1, at 70. The Convention participants believed the
enumeration of presidential powers was essential. See also BERGER, supra note 1, at 49-
59.
Of course, this arrangement has come under fire in the postwar period
on a number of policy grounds. Some have argued, for example, that
fundamental political and technological changes in the character of
international relations and the position of the United States in the world
have rendered obsolete an eighteenth century document designed for a
peripheral, small state in the European system of diplomatic relations.
Moreover, it has been asserted that quick action and a single, authoritative
voice are necessary to deal with an increasingly complex, interdependent,
and technologically linked world capable of almost instantaneous massive
destruction. Extollers of presidential dominance also have contended that
only the President has the qualitative information, the expertise, and the
capacity to act with the necessary dispatch to conduct U.S. foreign
policy.
33
These policy arguments have been reviewed, and discredited,
elsewhere; space limitations here permit only a brief commentary.
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Above all else, the implications of U.S. power and action in the twentieth
century have brought about an even greater need for institutional
accountability and collective judgment than existed two hundred years
ago. The devastating, incomprehensible destruction of nuclear war and the
possible extermination of the human race demonstrate the need for joint
participation in any decision to initiate war. Moreover, most of the
disputes at stake between the executive and legislative branches in foreign
affairs have virtually nothing to do with the need for rapid response to
crisis. Rather, they are concerned only with routine policy formulation and
execution, a classic example of the authority exercised under the
separation of powers doctrine.
35
Nevertheless, these joint functions have been fused by the executive
branch and have become increasingly unilateral, secretive, insulated from
public debate, and hence unaccountable. 36  In the wake of Vietnam,
Watergate, and the Iran-contra scandal, unilateral executive behavior has
become ever more difficult to defend. Scholarly appraisals have destroyed
arguments about intrinsic executive expertise and wisdom in foreign
affairs and the alleged superiority of information available to the
33 GELB & BETTS, supra note 2, at 363; Mulford Q. Sibley, Can Foreign Policy Be
Democratic?, in READINGS TN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 20-28 (Robert Goldwin &
Harry Clor eds. 2d ed., 1971). See generally ROBERT DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN
POLICY (1950); ADLER, TERMINATION, supra note 1, at 344-55.
34 DAHL, supra note 31, at 181; Francis D. Wormuth, The Presidency as an Ideal Type, in
ESSAYS IN LAWAND POLITICS 200-01 (D. Nelson & R. Sklar eds., 1978).
35 See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX.
L. REv. 833 (1972); William P. Rogers, Congress, the President, and War Powers, 59
CAL. L. REv. 1194 (1971).
36 See generally SCHLESINGER, supra note 1; WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 1, at
344-62; MVICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); JOHN HART ELY,
WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY (1993).
President.37  Moreover, the inattentiveness of presidents to important
details and the effects of "groupthink" that have dramatized and
exacerbated the relative inexperience of various presidents in international
relations have also devalued the extollers' arguments. Finally, foreign
policies, like domestic policies, are reflections of values. Against the
strength of democratic principles, recent occupants of the White House
have failed to demonstrate the superiority of their values in comparison to
those of the American people and their representatives in Congress.
The assumption of foreign affairs powers by recent presidents
represents a fundamental alteration of the Constitution that is both
imprudent and dangerous. We turn now to an examination of the
judiciary's contribution to executive hegemony in foreign affairs.
I. The Judiciary and Foreign Affairs
The Influence of Curtiss-Wright
There can be little doubt that the opinion in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp. in 1936 has been the Court's principal contribution to
the growth of executive power over foreign affairs.3 8  The Court's
declaration that the President is the "sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations" is a powerful, albeit unfortunate,
legacy of the case. 39 Even when the sole organ doctrine has not been
invoked by name, its spirit, indeed its talismanic aura, has provided a
common thread in a pattern of cases that have exalted presidential power
above constitutional norms.
The domination of Curtiss-Wright is reflected in the fact that it is quite
likely the most frequently cited case involving the allocation of foreign
affairs powers. 40 The Court's opinion possesses uncommon significance in
spite of the fact that the case raised merely the narrow question of the
constitutionality of a joint resolution that authorized the President to halt
the sale of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay, then involved in armed conflict
in the Chaco, in order to help stop the fighting. In an opinion by Justice
George Sutherland, the Court upheld the delegation of power against the
charge that it was unduly broad. If Justice Sutherland had confined his
remarks to this issue, Curtiss-Wright would have been overshadowed by
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and would never have surfaced in the tables
37 See, e.g., John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and Separation of Powers
Under the United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 229 (1995).
38 See, e.g., Brian Schoenborn, Public Participation in Trade Negotiations: Open
Agreements, Openly Arrived At?, 4 MNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 103, 104 (1995).
39 This view, as Schlesinger observed, went down in flames in Vietnam. Schlesinger,
supra note 1, at 282.
40 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
of contents of undergraduate textbooks. 4 1 But Sutherland strayed from the
issue and, in some ill-considered dicta, imparted an unhappy legacy: the
chimerical idea that authority in foreign affairs was essentially an
executive power, which he explained "as the very delicate, plenary, and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations, a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress."
42
Let us consider the historical context from which Sutherland extracted
the sole organ doctrine. In short, Sutherland greatly expanded on
Congressman John Marshall's speech in 1800 in which he noted, "The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations .. .Of
consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him."
43
Marshall was defending the decision of President John Adams to
surrender to British officials a British deserter, Jonathan Robbins, in
accordance with the Jay Treaty. The Robbins affair involved a demand
upon the United States, according to Marshall, and it required a response
from the President on behalf of the American people. At no point in his
speech did Marshall argue that the President's exclusive authority to
communicate with foreign nations included a power to formulate or
develop policy. Professor Edward S. Corwin properly concluded,
"Clearly, what Marshall had foremost in mind was simply the President's
role as instrument of communication with other governments." 44 This
point of procedure had been acknowledged in 1793 by then Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson, and this view had not been challenged. 45 Thus, it
was Sutherland who infused a purely communicative role with a
substantive policymaking function and thereby manufactured a great
power out of the Marshallian sole organ doctrine. To have done this, as
McDougal and Riesman observed, was to confuse the "organ" with the
"organ grinder" and effectively undermine the constitutional design for
collective decisionmaking in foreign affairs.
46
Curtiss-Wright, then, was a radical, path-breaking case. Despite the
fact that exclusive presidential authority was a product of Justice
Sutherland's imagination, and despite the fact that Sutherland's rhetoric
has been dismissed as "dictum," it has nevertheless enjoyed a long life.47
For more than fifty years now, the Court has trotted out the sole organ
doctrine whenever it has required a rationale to support a constitutionally
411d. at 320.
42 For some of the evidence, see Charles Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 3-5 (1973).
43 Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
44 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
45 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613-14 (1800).
46 CORWIN, supra note 29, at 216.
47 6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Paul Ford ed.
1895).
doubtful presidential action in foreign affairs. On such occasions, and they
have been numerous, the ghost of Curtiss-Wright has been made to walk
again. Even the most cursory review of the cases in which it has been
invoked makes clear that the essence of this "spirit" is great "deference to
executive judgment in this vast external realm" of foreign relations.48
This deference is perhaps attributable to the effects of "court-
positivism." According to this doctrine, the Court's decisions are treated
"as a given, to be explained, manipulated, and systematized, but criticized
only within narrow limits."49 This doctrine culminates in the view that the
Constitution means what the justices say it means. The tendency,
therefore, is to treat as "oracles" the few cases that have dotted an
otherwise barren constitutional landscape. Professor Gerhard Casper has
described court positivism thus: "It has also the paradoxical effect of
assigning a disproportionate importance to the few 'legal' precedents that
do exist. Absent the continuous consideration and reconsideration of rules
and principles, a few oracles have led to the emergence of a constitutional
mythology that does not bear close analysis." 50 For all its shortcomings,
Curtiss-Wright has assumed the status of an oracle. It has led the judiciary
to defer to executive judgment in cases involving executive agreements,
travel abroad, treaty termination, and the war power. Of course, these
judicial decisions have also drawn on the political question doctrine,
grounds of nonjusticiability and on the silence and inaction of Congress.
But the spirit of Curtiss-Wright is pervasive.
Executive Agreements
Since Curtiss-Wright, presidents have utilized executive agreements as
the primary means of dominating the conduct of foreign policy.5' This
practice, which has resulted in a flood of unilateral presidential
agreements, precludes a role for the Senate; therefore, executive
agreements subvert the basic constitutional scheme established in
Philadelphia.52 The structural design of the Treaty Clause, as we have
48 Raoul Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 577, 591 (1980).
49 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (dismissing Sutherland's theory as dictim). For discussion of the sole organ
doctrine, see Adler, Warmaking, supra note 1, at 29-35; Lofgren, supra note 38, at 29-35;
BERGER, supra note 1, at 100-08.
50 Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 221, 243 (1984) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)); see, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
51 H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Choices, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1128, 1136 (1985)
(book review).
52 Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense
Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 CHI. L. REv. 463, 475 (1976). With respect to the
seen, was to preclude the President from entering the field of foreign
affairs without the participation of the Senate. Fear of the abuse of power
dissuaded the framers from vesting the executive with such unilateral
authority.
53
There was no doubt among the framers and ratifiers that the treaty
making power was omnicompetent in foreign affairs; its authority covered
the field. As explained by Hamilton:
From the best opportunity of knowing the fact, I aver, that
it was understood by all to be the intent of the provision to
give that power the most ample latitude--to render it
competent to all the stipulations which the exigencies of
national affairs might require; competent to the making of
treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace,
and every other species of convention usual among nations
... And it was emphatically for this reason that it was so
carefully guarded; the cooperation of two-thirds of the
Senate with the President, being required to make any
treaty whatever.
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The text of the Constitution makes no mention of executive
agreements. Moreover, there was no reference to them in the
Constitutional Convention or in the state ratifying conventions. The
Federalist papers likewise are silent on the subject. There is, then, no
support in the architecture of the Constitution for executive agreements.
Yet their usage has flourished since 1936. Presidents claim independent
constitutional power to make them,55 and the judiciary has sustained such
presidential claims of authority. 56 The ultimate task, then, is to determine
the source from which the President derives the power to make executive
agreements.
conduct of foreign policy and its relationship to the Constitution, Casper observed that
the "relative scarcity of case law in the field has made it easier for judges to engage in
unchecked flights of fancy, which in turn have facilitated the creation of a constitutional
mythology. In that mythology, the role of Zeus is usually assigned to the President." Id.
at 477.
53 "The Office of Legal Advisor of the State Department reports 368 treaties and 5,590
other international agreements concluded by the United States between January 1, 1946
and April 1, 1972." Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 420 n. 1
(Minicola ed., Foundation Press 1972). See also Raoul Berger, The Presidential
Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972).
54 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REv. 799, 886 (1995).
55 William Davie, a framer from North Carolina, stated that "jealousy" of executive
power would not permit a grant of treaty power to the President alone. See ELLIOT,
supra note 14, vol. 4, at 120.
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 486-87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward M. Earle ed. 1937)
(emphasis added).
An examination of the leading cases involving executive agreements
discloses judicial reliance on two constitutional grounds: the sole organ
doctrine and the recognition power of the President.57 However, neither
of these grounds is tenable. In United States v. Belmont, Justice
Sutherland upheld the validity of an executive agreement that President
Franklin D. Roosevelt negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1933 involving
the assignment of assets in both countries. 58 The Court took judicial
notice that the Litvinov Assignment--an agreement on property claims
between Franklin Roosevelt and Maxim Litvinov--was executed in
conjunction with the 1933 recognition of the Soviet government. The
Court concluded that the pact derived its force both from the President's
status as sole organ and from his power to recognize foreign
governments. 59 Justice Sutherland stated that Senate consultation was not
required.6 °
Justice Sutherland's sole organ doctrine fares no better in the Belmont
setting. Moreover, his invocation of the President's "recognition power,"
which is derived from his duty under Article II, section 3, to "receive
Ambassadors and other public ministers," is misinterpreted. Hamilton,
Madison, and Jefferson shared the understanding that the recognition
clause conferred upon the President merely a ceremonial function that
does not include any "discretion" to reject foreign ministers.61 Writing
what Madison considered the "original gloss" on the meaning of the
clause, Hamilton explained:
[The authority] to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers.., is more a matter of dignity than authority. It is
a circumstance which will be without consequence in the
administration of government; and it was far more
convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than
there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or
one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign
minister, though it were merely to take the place of a
departed predecessor.
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By any measure, Hamilton was referring to a diplomatic function.
As Professor Louis Henkin has observed, "receiving ambassadors"
seems "a function rather than a 'power,' a ceremony which in many
57 For a fine discussion of the constitutionality of executive agreements, see BERGER,
supra note 1, at 140-62.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
59I[d.
60 [d.
61 [d. at 330.
62 [d.
countries is performed by a figurehead., 63 Indeed, the distinction between
a power and a function cannot be stressed too strongly. Henkin has justly
remarked that "while making treaties and appointing ambassadors are
described as 'powers' of the President, receiving ambassadors is included
in section 3, which does not speak in terms of power but lists things the
President 'shall' or 'may do."4
Given the apparent refusal of the Convention members to convert the
recognition clause into a well of discretionary power and to clothe the
President with the treaty making power so that he alone might conduct
foreign policy, Belmont certainly represents an "extreme extension" of
presidential power in foreign affairs.65 This extension contravenes not
only the structure of the treaty power but also the policy reasons that
predetermined that structure. Justice Sutherland did not address the
Framers' intent in Belmont.
The Court again considered the validity of the Litvinov Assignment in
1942 in United States v. Pink.66 Echoing the opinion in Belmont, Justice
William 0. Douglas invoked the sole organ doctrine as well as the
recognition power as authorization for the executive agreement.
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However, there was no need for Justice Douglas to attempt to sustain the
assignment on purely presidential powers. He concluded that "the
executive policy had been 'tacitly' recognized by congressional
appointment of commissioners to determine American claims against the
Soviet fund., 6 8 However, Chief Justice Harlan Stone exposed the real
issue in his dissent by stating, "We are referred to no authority which
would sustain such an exercise of power as is said to have been exerted
here by mere assignment unratified by the Senate."
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Belmont and Pink, in drawing upon Curtiss-Wrighfl, can be seen as
facilitating the trend toward presidential control of U.S. foreign policy, at
least with respect to the use of executive agreements. And beginning in
1937, a virtual torrent of such agreements was unleashed, at the expense
of the Senate and its constitutional role in making treaties.71 This trend,
which continues to this day, as seen in Dames & Moore v. Regan,
63 See David Gray Adler, The President's Recognition Power, PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES
QUARTERLY, ch. 25 at 267-87 (1995).
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 69 at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward M. Earle ed. 1937).
65 HENKIN, supra note 51, at 41.6 6 [d.
67 Hamilton stated that "the history of human conduct does not warrant the commitment
of interests so delicate and momentus a kind . . . to the sole disposal of the President."
THE FEDERALIST No. 75 at 486 (Edward M. Earle ed. 1937).
68 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
6 9 [d. at 223.
70 BERGER, supra note 1, at 160.
71 Pink, 315 U.S. at 249 (Stone, J., dissenting).
constitutes a fundamental and extraordinary shift of power from Congress
to the President.
72
In Dames & Moore, which represented "a political decision by a
political court," the High Tribunal was at pains to sustain the
constitutionality of President Jimmy Carter's executive agreement with
Iran that secured the release of American hostages. 73 In his opinion for
the Court, then Justice (now Chief Justice) William Rehnquist found
statutory authorization for much of the agreement but none for a critical
leg: the suspension of all claims pending against Iran in U.S. courts.
74
Undaunted, Justice Rehnquist held that Congress had "tacitly" approved
the President's pact. Apparently, Congress had evinced its support in two
ways. First, Rehnquist located two statutes, the "general tenor" of which,
he said, had delegated broad discretionary power to the President.75 He
conceded, however, that the statutes alone did not provide sufficient
authority for the agreement. 76 Second, Justice Rehnquist asserted that, by
virtue of its silence, Congress had acquiesced in the agreement. The Court
concluded that the absence of explicit delegation did not imply
congressional disapproval but merely showed that Congress had not
anticipated such a situation.
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To be sure, the doctrine of "tacit" delegation based on congressional
acquiescence has its place in American jurisprudence. But "tacit"
delegation is an acquiescence of a particular kind; it is based on a settled
congressional understanding of an administrative construction of a statute.
In other words, suppose an administrative agency adopts an erroneous
interpretation of a statute. If Congress reenacts the statute with knowledge
of the administrative interpretation, it is said to incorporate that
interpretation and to give statutory standing to what was previously
unlawful.78 In effect, Congress ratifies and adopts that construction.
We find a single decision supporting this supposition. In the nineteenth
century, Congress passed a number of statutes that made public lands
available for private occupation. However, on hundreds of occasions,
without statutory authority, the President withdrew some land from the
right of entry. In 1915, in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., the Court
upheld President William Taft's withdrawal of certain lands from the
72 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
73 See, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 52 at 885.
74 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
75 Arthur S. Miller, Dames & Moore v. Regan: A Political Decision by a Political Court,
29 UCLA L. REV. 1104, 1107 (1982).76 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673-77.
7 7 [d. at 678.
7 81 d. at 677-78.
appropriation of oil rights offered to the public by an act passed in 1897. 71
The Court, consistent with the doctrine of tacit delegation, stated that the
"long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress," had
gained the "implied consent of Congress."
80
There is, of course, no merit to the argument that an executive abuse of
power acquires legal status if Congress does not correct it. In a parallel
case, the Supreme Court held that a well-established, well-known and
long-continued practice of granting suspended sentences did not justify
the federal courts in following this practice when the statute did not
authorize it.81 Nevertheless, the case is one of statutory interpretation. It
treated congressional acquiescence as statutory authorization, not as a
gloss on the Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist invoked Midwest Oil as precedential authority for
his theory that Congress may acquiesce in presidential practices through
silence. Of course, Midwest Oil is inapposite to Dames & Moore. In
Midwest Oil, the Court recognized that Congress had passed a number of
statutes with full knowledge of prior presidential action. Those statutes
provided the requisite ratification of an administrative action. There was
no such ratification in Dames & Moore. Indeed, even Rehnquist conceded
that Congress had not passed a single statute to authorize the executive
agreement in the Iranian hostage crisis. Finally, Congress did not even
grant the "tacit" consent that it had in Pink, by virtue of its appointment of
negotiators. There was no such congressional support in Dames & Moore.
What remained for Rehnquist at this point was to glean congressional
support from congressional silence. This enterprise was problematic;
indeed, the Court has stated that it is "treacherous to find in congressional
silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." 82 A failure to
object does not necessarily mean that Congress approves of the action.
There may be numerous reasons why Congress may not act even though a
majority of the body may disagree with the President. Professor Gewirtz
has written:
[W]hen Congress is faced with an executive policy that is
in place and functioning, Congress often acquiesces in the
executive's action for reasons which have nothing to do
with the majority's preferences on the policy issues
7 9 Id. at 678-89. See also United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1983), reh'g
granted, 732 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that unchallenged historical practice is no
longer sufficient evidence of constitutionality).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Arrendondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 713-14 (1832); United
States v. Alexander, 12 Wall. 127, 180 (1871); United States v. Safety Car Heating and
Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 95 (1936).
81 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
82 Id. at 474, 478.
involved... In such a situation, Congress may not want to
be viewed as disruptive; or Congresspersons may not want
to embarrass the President; or Congress may want to score
political points by attacking the executive's action rather
than accepting political responsibility for some action
itself; or Congresspersons may be busy running for
reelection or tending to constituents' individual problems;
or Congress may be lazy and prefer another recess.
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The implications of Justice Rehnquist's reasoning are staggering.
Ineluctably, the "doctrine of silence" would sanction "an almost total
transfer of legislative power to the executive, so long as Congress does not
object., 84 Justice Rehnquist's argument is not new, of course, for it is but
a page torn from Theodore Roosevelt's "stewardship theory" of the
presidency. As explained by Roosevelt:
I decline to adopt this view that what was imperatively
necessary for the nation could not be done by the President,
unless he could find some specific authorization to do it...
I did not usurp power but I did greatly broaden the use of
executive power. In other words, I acted for the common
well being of all our people whenever and in whatever
measure was necessary, unless prevented by direct
constitutional or legislative prohibition.
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Roosevelt's view, like Rehnquist's, "means that the President is free to
undertake any folly, provided it is so gross that it has not occurred to
Congress to forbid it."
' 6
At bottom, perhaps Dames & Moore v. Regan should not be
understood as having sustained a purely executive agreement; after all,
Justice Rehnquist ruled that the President enjoyed congressional
authorization through tacit delegation. But Justice Rehnquist has
misapplied the doctrine. As applied, it is a prescription for the exercise of
unilateral presidential power in foreign affairs.
Travel Cases
83 Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
84 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946); see also Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942).
85 Paul Gerwitz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three
Doctrines, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 79 (footnote omitted).
86 Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a
Frameworkfor Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 863, 889 (1983).
For the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has steadily increased the
power of the President to restrict the right of U.S. citizens to travel abroad.
The peak of the Court's respect for the wishes of citizens to visit foreign
lands was exhibited in its 1958 ruling in Kent v. Dulles, where the Court
found that the right to travel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 87 Since then, the Court has managed to "find"
exceptions to that right by bowing to painfully plastic invocations of
national security needs. The Court's vulnerability to the spirit of Curtiss-
Wright-"deference to the judgment of the executive"--and its willingness
to find congressional "approval" of State Department passport policies on
the flimsiest of pretexts, have created an environment in which the
administration is the sole judge of its policies. 88 In just a handful of cases,
the Court has transmuted a congressional lawmaking function to
determine what, if any, restrictions are to be imposed in foreign travel into
a discretionary executive policymaking tool of great scope. In light of this
fundamental shift of power, Justice Brennan has been moved to remark,
"The reach of the Secretary [of State]'s discretion is potentially
staggering.
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The first national passport legislation passed in 1858 vested in the
executive branch the exclusive authority to issue passports. Congress
codified the language of this act in the Passport Act of 1926.90 The 1926
Act did not grant specific authority to the Secretary of State to refuse or
revoke passports because, at that time, Congress did not require passports
for international travel by U.S. citizens except during periods of war or
national emergency. 91 However, the Court found in Kent v. Dulles that, in
passing the 1926 Passport Act, Congress had adopted the State
Department's prior administrative practice. Apparently, the Secretary of
State had authority to resolve questions of the allegiance of a passport
applicant, which meant verifying his or her citizenship as well as
investigating the applicant's criminal activity. In the latter case the
Secretary could deny passports to those violating U.S. law or seeking to
escape the law. Thus, the adoption of this administrative practice by
statute constituted a legalization of that practice.
The Court has ruled on only a few cases challenging the validity of
State Department regulations developed under the Passport Act. In Kent v.
Dulles, the first major case concerning this issue, the Secretary of State
denied the passport application of two Communists under a department
regulation that prohibited the issuance of passports to Communist party
87 WILLIAM H. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 143 (1925) (quoting
Theodore Roosevelt).
88 Francis D. Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CAL. L.
REv. 623, 678 (1972).
89 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
90 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
91 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
members or to persons going abroad to engage in activities enhancing the
Communist movement. The Court invalidated the regulation, per Justice
Douglas, who ruled that the freedom to travel is a "liberty" protected by
the Fifth Amendment and, moreover, that any regulation of the freedom to
travel must be made pursuant to the congressional lawmaking function
and must therefore be narrowly construed. Since the secretary lacks
express authority to deny passports, only an administrative practice clearly
adopted by Congress would imply a delegation of its lawmaking function.
The Court found that neither the established administrative practice nor
the specific delegation to the Secretary were sufficient to deny a passport
merely because of one's beliefs and associations.
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The bubble burst seven years later in Zemel v. Rusk, in which the
Court, per Chief Justice Earl Warren, sustained the Administration's total
ban on travel to Cuba.93 The Court applied the standard developed in
Kent and claimed to have discovered a substantial and consistent State
Department practice of restricting travel to named geographic areas, both
in wartime and peacetime, sufficient to warrant a conclusion that Congress
was aware of the Secretary's policy and thus implicitly approved of such
restrictions. The substance and "consistency" of such a practice is
doubtful. Justice Arthur Goldberg, in a dissenting opinion, revealed that
these "precedents" occurred during the proximity of war and were thus
immaterial because they fell within the war power of the executive.
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The Zemel Court also dismissed the Fifth Amendment challenge,
reasoning that if the government could restrict travel within the United
States for safety and welfare purposes, then surely the State Department
could similarly restrict travel to Cuba for the same reasons. Chief Justice
Warren, invoking Curtiss-Wright, said that "the weightiest considerations
of national security" permit these travel restraints without violating due
process.
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Justice Hugo Black filed a strong dissenting opinion and took Warren
to task for permitting the executive branch to make laws:
Since Article I, however, vests "All legislative Powers" in
the Congress, and no language in the Constitution purports
to vest any such power in the President, it necessarily
follows, if the Constitution is to control, that the President
is completely devoid of power to make laws regulating
92 22 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (Supp. III 1979).
93 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1965). The general passport requirement
became law in 1952 with passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. §
1185 (1958).
94 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116-119, 124-25, 128, 130.
95 Zemel, 381 U.S. at 15-16.
passports or anything else. And he has no more power to
make laws by labeling them regulations than to do so by
calling them laws . . . I cannot accept the Government's
argument that the President has "inherent" power to make
regulations governing the issuance and use of passports.
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In Kent and Zemel, the Court recognized enforcement as one method
of establishing congressional awareness and approval of the regulation.
But it also stated, in terms foreshadowing Dames & Moore v. Regan, that
courts could find approval from nothing more than congressional silence
about a long-standing administrative practice. Chief Justice Warren
Burger concluded that Congress had implicitly adopted the administrative
construction because it had not made any changes in the executive's basic
rulemaking power when it passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 or when it amended the Passport Act in 1978. Chief Justice Burger
observed that Congress must have been aware of the "longstanding and
officially promulgated view" of the State Department that the President
could revoke passports for reasons of national security. There is, of
course, no such official policy, and the cases advanced by Burger are not
supportive.
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The Kent-Zemel standard, which required a consistent pattern of actual
enforcement in order to establish the requisite congressional approval, was
for all intents and purposes overruled in Haig v. Agee.98 Haig produced a
new standard for establishing congressional approval: that Congress
allows the State Department to construct its own regulations provides
sufficient basis to assume implicit congressional approval of a passport
regulation.99 The Court in Kent had rejected a similar assertion by the
government, holding that only an established departmental practice can
convince the Court that Congress is sufficiently aware of the claimed
authority. But the Court in the Haig decision did not require frequent
instances of enforcement in order to build a track record. Even if no
enforcement occurred, the validity of the executive's authority would not
be destroyed, nor would lack of enforcement preclude congressional
awareness of the State Department's construction.
l °°
961d. at 17-18, 27-40.
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Id. at 15-16.
9 8 Id. at 20 (Black, J., dissenting).
99 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 301 (1981). For example, although the Court relied on
Zemel, the Zemel Court had noted the historical consistency with which area travel
restrictions were imposed both before and after the passage of the Passport Act of 1926.
That practice, or at least the claim of a practice, and not the State Department's
construction of its own regulation, permitted the Court to sustain the travel ban to Cuba.
Id.100 Haig, 452 U.S. 280.
That the Court could assume this position is all the more incredible in
light of Congress' 1978 amendment of the Passport Act so as to deprive
the President of all discretion with respect to the issuance of passports
except to those countries with which the United States is at war or where
there is imminent danger to Americans. 1 1 Yet in the face of this statute,
the Court asserted the superiority of national security claims, stating that
"it is obvious and unarguable that no government interest is more
compelling than the security of the nation." 10 2 Therefore, said the Court,
the government may regulate foreign travel within the limits of due
process. But the guarantees of due process demand nothing more than the
offer of a prompt revocation administrative hearing and a statement of
reasons for the action.
103
Given the Court's view in Haig that the executive branch need merely
assert a construction of its own regulation in order to satisfy the need for
congressional awareness, it is little wonder that Justice Brennan would
view the State Department's discretion as "potentially staggering."'1
0 4
Perhaps his use of the word "potentially" was optimistic. The discretion
already is "staggering."
The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine, the "principle under which the courts
defer the determination of an issue to the political branches of
government," stems primarily from the Court's concern for the separation
of powers and its own role within that scheme. 0 5 There is a continuing
debate about the scope of the doctrine, the essence of which involves two
very different theories.
Chief Justice John Marshall espoused the "classical" view in Cohens v.
Virginia, stating that the courts "have no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."' 10 6
Similarly, Professor Herbert Wechsler has said that the existence of a
political question in any particular issue is determined by "whether the
Constitution has committed to another agency of government the
autonomous determination of the issue." 10 7 Accordingly, a court must
101 Id. at 306.102 Id. at 303.
103 22 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (Supp. III 1979).
104 Haig, 453 U.S. at 307 (citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509
(1964)).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 319 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107 Edwin B. Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 COL. L.
REV. 65, 66 (1977); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-22 (1969); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
first decide the threshold separation of powers issue before it can invoke
the political question doctrine. 10 8 A second theory, the "prudential" view,
holds that courts should weigh the consequences that a particular case
might have on the judiciary before addressing the merits of the claim. 10 9
The invocation of the political question doctrine has been a major
means by which the judiciary has strengthened the President's role in
foreign affairs. This section examines the judicial application of the
doctrine in the areas of war making and treaty termination. First we turn to
Goldwater v. Carter, in which Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, stretched
the doctrine beyond its previous limits.I
10
Treaty Termination
In Goldwater v. Carter, Senator Barry Goldwater challenged President
Carter's unilateral termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan."' In an opinion by Rehnquist (Burger, Stewart, and Stevens
concurring), it was held that the issue of treaty termination represented a
nonjusticiable political question precisely because it involved "the
authority of the President in the conduct of foreign relations and the extent
to which the senate or congress is authorized to negate the action of the
President."
112
The plurality's decision clearly is unfounded. In the words of Justice
William Brennan's dissent, the quartet "profoundly misapprehend[ed] the
political question doctrine as it applies to foreign relations." 113 Indeed, in
the opinion of Justice Lewis Powell, who concurred in the dismissal of the
case but on grounds of ripeness, the foursome's "reliance upon the
political question doctrine [was] inconsistent with our precedents." 114
In his notable opinion in Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan drew order
from the confusion surrounding the political question doctrine.1 15 After a
108 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
109 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 7-8 (1959).
110 See, e.g., Powell, 395 U.S. at 521 (1968); Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (1961).
111 See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); PHILIPPA
STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
EVASION (1974).
112 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
113 Id. Mutual Defense Treaty, December 2, 1954, U.S.-P.R.C., 6 U.S.T. 433. Article X
of the Treaty provided that it "shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may
terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party." Id. at 437. For
details of the case and the history and law regarding treaty termination, see ADLER,
TERMINATION, supra note 1, at 149-307.
114 Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002.
11
' Id. at 1006.
discussion of the previous cases, he set forth six alternative tests for
identifying political questions:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
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The issue of treaty termination does not conform to any of these
analytical components of the political question doctrine. Justice Brennan's
first test--a textual commitment--has been justly characterized by
Wechsler as the governing principle of the doctrine. He stated that "all the
doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called upon to judge
whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of government
the autonomous determination of the issue raised." ' 1 7 There is, of course,
no textual commitment of the authority to terminate treaties, for the
Constitution is silent on the point. Thus, Goldwater certainly could not be
labeled a political question case on this ground.
Under Brennan's second test, there is also no "lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving the issue.118 For
example, the Court might have examined the logic of the treaty power's
structure and drawn the inference that the authority to terminate treaties is
coalescent with the treaty power. Support for this symmetrical
construction was expressed by Justices Joseph Story and Benjamin
Cardozo, two of the nation's most eminent jurists. Or the Court might have
studied the historical practice of treaty termination, which would have
revealed three alternatives: termination by the President and Senate
jointly, by congressional directive, or by independent presidential action.
Any one of these inquiries would have disclosed "manageable
standards.""
9
116 Id. at 998.
117 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1981).
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" Id. at 217.
119 Wechsler, supra note 107, at 7-8.
Neither Brennan's third test, which prohibits a nonjudicial policy
determination, nor his fourth, which precludes resolution of the issue if it
would require the judiciary to exhibit insufficient respect toward a
coordinate branch of government, is applicable here either. 120 Surely the
courts may not undertake an initial policy determination to make or
terminate a treaty, for this type of action is nonjudicial. But deciding
whether the appropriate political branch has made that determination is
clearly justiciable. 121 Moreover, the Court does not commit such a social
solecism if it determines that the President has transgressed constitutional
bounds. As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Marbury v. Madison, "to
what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained?"' 122 Whatever risk of insufficient respect toward
the President exists, the overriding concern must attach to the integrity of
the Constitution and its framework of limited government. "It is far more
important," observed Justice Douglas, "to be respectful to the Constitution
than to a coordinate branch of the government."'
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Brennan's fifth criterion is "an unusual need for unquestioned
adherence to a political decision already made."'124 Although it is not clear
which cases might satisfy this criterion, outside of, perhaps, a declaration
of war, it is hard to imagine that this test could encompass the termination
of a treaty.
Finally, the last reason cited by Brennan was "the potential
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question."' 125 Brennan probably had in mind Luther v. Borden, in
which the Court was asked to decide which of two rival governments was
the legitimate republican government in Rhode Island.' 26  That case
represented the possibility of six pronouncements, by six departments, on
one question. In Goldwater, however, we do not find "multifarious
pronouncements." Indeed, only the President acted, and that action was
challenged as unconstitutional. If the Court had ruled that President
Carter's termination of the Taiwan Treaty were invalid, that fact no doubt
120 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
121 See ADLER, TERMINATION, supra note 1, at 84-237 for a discussion of these points.
122 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
123 Justice Brennan wrote in his dissenting opinion that the issue of decisionmaking
authority must be resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion;
accordingly, it falls within the competence of the courts. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996, 1007. Moreover, Justice Powell, concurring only in the result, wrote that we are
asked to decide whether the President may terminate a treaty under the constitution
without congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be easy, but it only
requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to the constitutional provisions at
issue. Id. at 999.
124 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
125 Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 894 (1970).
126 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
would have been embarrassing to some and annoying to Peking, but it
would not have produced the chaos Justice Brennan had in mind.
For Justice Rehnquist, the issue of treaty termination was a
nonjusticiable political question merely because it raised the question of
the allocation of foreign affairs power between the President and
Congress. Rehnquist thus ignored Justice Brennan's sagacious observation
in Baker v. Carr that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."' 127
Justice Rehnquist's obeisance to the President in the conduct of foreign
policy recalls the folly of Curtiss-Wright, the proposition that the
President is the sole organ in foreign affairs.
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Whatever authority the President has in the formulation of
international policy, he is not the Pied Piper, and the other branches of
government and the American public are not the children of Hamlin. Such
a storybook view of presidential power cannot be reconciled with
constitutional restrictions. To be sure, the allocation of power in the
Constitution is not always clear, but when there is a question as to the
repository of authority, determination of the matter is left to the courts.
Justice Rehnquist's view that each of the branches "has resources available
to protect its interests" would, as Raoul Berger has remarked, "return us to
settlement of differences by Kentucky feud.' 29 Rehnquist's adoration for
127 Id.
128 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (1 How.) 1, 7 (1849).
129 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. In Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988), however, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated he believed that judicial
power extends to some cases affecting foreign affairs. In writing for an 8-1 majority, he
held that the judiciary is not precluded from hearing a constitutional challenge to the
dismissal of a CIA employee, in spite of the fact that the executive branch had claimed
that sensitive material-security information-would be compromised. The ruling was
important, for as one editor observed:
To allow the executive to usurp the judiciary's role as arbiter of
conflicts between legitimate security interests and individual rights-
the inevitable consequence of the government's . . . argument in
Webster-would be to remove all external guarantees that the rule of
law governs the national security apparatus of the United States.
See Note, The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 330, 339 (1988)
(quoting IICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 313 (1990)). But this
encouraging development was dwarfed by a cold reminder that the Court will reflexively
invoke Curtiss- Wright to justify presidential actions in foreign affairs. In Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993), Justice Stevens spoke for an 8-1 majority,
with Justice Blackmun dissenting, which upheld an executive order issued by President
Bush directing the Coast Guard to intercept vessels illegally transporting passengers from
Haiti to the United States and to return them to Haiti without first determining whether
they qualify as refugees. While the legal focus was on whether the executive order
violated a congressional statute and the United Nations Convention relating to the status
of refugees, the Court grounded its ruling in Curtiss-Wright. The Court deferred to
this sort of legal Darwinism would not save us from a covetous or
usufructuary executive, but a Court committed to the Constitution might.
In an astute study of the political question doctrine, Professor Fritz
Scharpf concluded that "the political question.., had no place when the
[C]ourt was presented with conflicting claims of competence among the
departments of the federal government."' 130  That was the view of the
Court in Powell v. McCormack, where it declared that its principal duty
was to decide "whether the action of [another] branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed.' 3 1 In Goldwater, however, the Court
abdicated that duty. Despite Justice Powell's reminder that in the past the
Court had been willing to determine "whether one branch of our
government has impinged upon the power of another," the Court declined
to answer a very straightforward question in Goldwater: In which
department of government does the Constitution vest the authority to
terminate treaties?
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As a practical matter, the Court's action, or rather its inaction, left the
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty intact. Although the plurality
opinion in Goldwater did not establish a legal precedent, it will
nevertheless establish a foundation, however shaky, for future unilateral
presidential treaty terminations. 133 This result will have the unfortunate
effect of placing the exclusive authority to terminate defense, commercial,
economic, and arms control agreements, among others, in the hands of the
President.
Political Questions and the War Power
Since 1950, the United States has been involved in a series of
unilateral executive wars. Presidential usurpation of the war power has
become commonplace, but this practice violates the policy objectives of
the War Clause. Those present at the Constitutional Convention, fearful
that one man might rush the nation into war, vested in Congress the
exclusive power to initiate hostilities. Apparently oblivious to the
common sense underlying this allocation of power, the judiciary remains a
co-conspirator in this bifurcation of law and practice.
presidential decision in foreign affairs on the basis of the claim that such a presumption
has special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve
foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility. Id. at 188.
130 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
131 BERGER, supra note 46, at 625.
132 Frank Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75
YALE L.J. 517, 585 (1966).
133 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1968).
Indeed, its invocation of the political question doctrine has been a
major means by which the judiciary has strengthened the role of the
President in the conduct of foreign policy. Throughout the Vietnam War,
for example, lower courts routinely invoked the doctrine in response to
challenges to the constitutionality of that war, and many observers viewed
this unwillingness to address the merits of the claims as a sign of judicial
approval of administration policy. 134  This reticence certainly did not
dissuade the President from continuing the war effort.
Aside from the problematical inferences drawn from the silence of the
courts, the Vietnam War--like the Korean War before it and the later wars
in Grenada and Panama--did not receive congressional authorization,
which the Constitution requires. 135  The fact that various Presidents
initiated war without congressional authorization created a constitutional
crisis that might have been resolved by the judiciary, but it was not. As a
consequence, the United States has suffered a string of presidential wars
from Korea to Panama.
This series of presidential wars reflects a fundamental shift of power
from Congress to the President. In a few cases challenging President
Ronald Reagan's military adventures in Grenada, Nicaragua, and El
Salvador, lower courts have refused to rule on the merits. As might be
expected, they have held that these cases constitute nonjusticiable,
political questions. 136  Judicial reluctance to enforce constitutional
boundaries in the area of foreign policy has threatened, in Raoul Berger's
phrase, to convert the Jefferson "'chains of the Constitution' into ropes of
sand.' 37 The effect has been to encourage the tendencies of the imperial
presidency. It is no surprise, therefore, that recent presidents have come to
view the military of the United States as a private army at their beck and
call to fulfill the goals of a foreign policy agenda. However, this shift
threatens the foundation of our republican form of government as well as
our tradition of constitutionalism.
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The nation's need for a judicial branch that will unflinchingly "say
what the law is," therefore, is of greatest importance. 139 The law, as we
134 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001 (1979).
135 In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942), the Court observed that an equally
divided vote on the controlling principle of law involved prevents it from being an
authoritative determination for other cases. Id. In fact, the Goldwater case was vacated
by the Court. Nevertheless, it already had been invoked as authority in Beacon Prods. v.
Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986).
136 See generally Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints and Foreign Policy, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 471 n.30 (1976); Michael Ratner & David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial
Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 715 (1984).
137 See supra notes 15-25; Adler, Warmaking, supra note 1, at 1-29.
131 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
139 Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. L. REv. 695,
712 (1996) (quoting ELLIOT, supra note 14, at 543).
have seen, was articulated in a number of cases at the dawn of the
Republic: only Congress may constitutionally initiate war. 140  The
unwillingness of the judiciary to declare the Vietnam War unconstitutional
illustrates the fact that the judicial branch of government abdicated its
institutional duties. There is no need here to review the judiciary's
treatment of the cases challenging the legality of that war, for such
reviews can be found elsewhere. 14 1 Suffice it to say that although no court
affirmed the legality of the unilateral presidential war, only one court
declared the war illegal. 142 At the district and circuit court levels, judges
routinely declared the issues nonjusticiable, and the Supreme Court
routinely denied certiorari.
143
Recent lower court decisions have, in the tradition of the Vietnam War
rulings, dismissed challenges to presidential warmaking on various
grounds of nonjusticiability. In Crockett v. Reagan, the D.C. Court of
Appeals dismissed as a political question a suit filed by members of
Congress that claimed President Reagan had violated the War Powers
Resolution when he failed to submit a report that American soldiers had
been introduced into hostilities in El Salvador. 144 The Court refused to
engage in the fact-finding necessary to determine whether hostilities
existed or were imminent and reasoned that "[t]he question here belongs
to the category characterized by a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolution." 14' The Court stated that it lacked
"the resources and expertise [necessary] to resolve disputed questions of
fact concerning the military situation in El Salvador."'146 The difficulty
involved in the fact-finding process, however, did not justify the
invocation of the political question doctrine since the Supreme Court, in
Baker v. Carr, had fenced off resolution of disputes characterized by
uncertain legal standards but not those which entailed difficulties in
settling questions of fact.
147
Members of Congress who claimed that President Reagan's use of
military force in the Persian Gulf in 1987 violated the procedures of the
140 The manner of the exercise of the war powers determines not only the nation's
freedom from external danger, but also the respect which the national government has for
law and for constitutional limitations on the exercise of power. WORMUTH & FIRMAGE,
supra note 1, at 66.
141 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
142 See, e.g., supra notes 15-25.
143 See, e.g., Ratner & Cole, supra note 134, at 715.
144 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (1973) (holding the bombing of
Cambodia during the Vietnam War to be illegal).
145 See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied 387 U.S.
945 (1967).
146 Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'dper curiam, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1976).
147 Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 898.
War Powers Resolution met a similar fate in Lowry v. Reagan.14 8 In
Lowry, 110 plaintiffs saw their suit dismissed on two grounds: political
question and remedial discretion. Here, as in Crockett, the Court
misapplied the political question doctrine. The Court feared that a decision
on the merits--whether a cease-fire in the Gulf meant that U.S. forces were
in a situation in which hostilities were either present or imminent--would
have required an evaluation of the stability of the cease-fire, a task
"beyond judicial cognizance."' 149 However, the existence of disputed
questions of fact does not provide a basis to apply the political question
doctrine; if that were so, judicial abstention would be the rule and not the
exception. Disputed facts must be resolved through the traditional means
of gathering evidence, not buried by resort to the doctrine of political
questions.
The district court in Lowry also dismissed the lawsuit on the basis of
the doctrine of remedial discretion, a judicial tool which mandates
dismissal of congressional claims where members have an effective in-
house remedy for their injuries, such as the enactment, repeal or
amendment of a statute. 150 In 1985, in Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, D.C.
Circuit Judge (now Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring
opinion in which she dismissed as not ripe for review a suit brought by
twelve members of Congress on issues arising from U.S. actions in
Nicaragua.151 Judge Ginsburg said of the War Clause claim, "The Judicial
Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between
the President and Congress until the political branches reach a
constitutional impasse."'152 Moreover,
Congress has formidable weapons at its disposal--the
power of the purse and investigative resources far beyond
those available in the Third Branch. But no gauntlet has
been thrown down here by a majority of the Members of
Congress. On the contrary, Congress expressly allowed the
President to spend federal funds to support paramilitary
operations in Nicaragua. "If the Congress chooses not to
confront the President, it is not our task to do so."
153
141 Id.; see also Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that suit
filed by eleven members of Congress against President Reagan for his invasion of
Grenada in 1983 was not within the jurisdiction of the court because relief was available
to members through the regular legislative process), appeal dismissed, 765 F.2d 1124
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The message was a sobering one: if Congress wants to confront the
President, it must assert its own powers; judicial relief is not available.
149 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
150 Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).1511d. at 340 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
152 Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337; see also Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d
873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
153 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
The message from the Court was clear and familiar: if Congress fails to
assert its powers, it cannot expect to be protected by the judiciary.
The Lowry Court viewed the lawsuit as "a by-product of political
disputes within Congress regarding the applicability of the War Powers
Resolution to the Persian Gulf situation." 154  The Court drew this
conclusion from the numerous bills that had been introduced to "compel
the President to invoke" the Resolution, to strengthen it, and to repeal it.
155
The tribunal embraced Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Goldwater
v. Carter and stated that the "passage of legislation to enforce the
Resolution, would pose a question ripe for review," but that Congress had
not passed a law and without it the Court would be interfering in the
legislative debate. 156 The court's major error in this line of reasoning was
its assumption that the plaintiffs' dispute was with "fellow legislators" and
not with the President. 57 Lowry did not involve an intramural debate.
Indeed, Congress had, in the passage of the War Powers Resolution,
required the President to submit a report when troops had been introduced
into hostilities or when hostilities were imminent. 158 President Reagan
had not complied with the law and the plaintiffs simply sought
enforcement of it.
In 1990, in the closely-watched case Dellums v. Bush, U.S. District
Judge Harold H. Greene dismissed as not ripe for review a congressional
challenge to President George Bush's claim of unilateral authority to wage
war in Kuwait. 59 Nevertheless, in his decision Judge Greene forcefully
rejected many of the sweeping claims made by the executive branch. He
stated:
[If the President] had the sole power to determine that any
particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast,
does not constitute war-making but only an offensive
military attack, the congressional power to declare war will
be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the Executive.
Such an 'interpretation' would evade the plain language of
the Constitution, and it cannot stand.
160
114Id. at 210-11 (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979)).
155 Id. at 211 (citing Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998).
156 Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 338.157 
Id.
158 Id. at 339; cf Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1000-01.
159 Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 339 (quoting Reigle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d
873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981)).
160 War Powers Resolution, Ch. 87 Stat. 555 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48
(1982)). Section 4(a)(1) of the Resolution, in fact, does not give the President any
discretion. If events occur that continue "hostilities or . . . situations where imminent
In response to the Department of Justice's contention that the issue was
political and not judicial, Judge Greene ruled:
[T]he Department goes on to suggest that the issue in this
case is still political rather than legal, because in order to
resolve the dispute the court would have to inject itself into
foreign affairs, a subject which the Constitution commits to
the political branches. That argument, too, must fail. While
the Constitution grants to the political branches, and in
particular to the Executive, responsibility for conducting the
nation's foreign affairs, it does not follow that the judicial
power is excluded from the resolution of cases merely
because they may touch upon such affairs... In fact, courts
are routinely deciding cases that touch upon or even have a
substantial impact on foreign and defense policy.
16 1
Although Judge Greene rejected the Bush Administration's sweeping
assertions of independent presidential war powers, he nevertheless
determined that the case was not ripe for judicial determination "unless
the Congress as a whole, or by a majority, is heard from, the controversy
here cannot be deemed ripe; it is only if the majority of the Congress
seeks relief from an infringement on its constitutional war-declaration
power that it may be entitled to receive it."
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While there is merit to the judicial concerns underlying the doctrines
of ripeness and remedial discretion, the judiciary's obligation to police
constitutional boundaries remains a greater concern. As these matters
stand, if a minority in either the House or the Senate is unable to move its
chamber to repel a presidential usurpation of power, the minority cannot
find relief in court. This problem is particularly acute in the case of war-
making, since members of Congress will have been deprived of their
constitutional authority to vote on the wisdom of initiating war. The
application of these judicial barriers was defended in Lowry and Dellums
by the resuscitation of Justice Powell's emphasis on the silence of
Congress with respect to the issue of treaty termination in his concurring
opinion in Goldwater:
Congress has taken no official action. In the present posture
of this case, we do not know whether there ever will be an
actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive
branches ... It cannot be said that either the Senate or the
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," a report must be
submitted.
161 Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
162 Id. at 1145.
House has rejected the President's claim. If the Congress
chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to
do so. 1
6 3
The invocation of the doctrines of ripeness and remedial discretion in
warmaking cases, on grounds that Congress has taken no action with
respect to presidential warmaking, ignores the fact that the institutional
indifference of members of Congress toward their constitutional
responsibilities has no bearing whatever on the Court's duties, which are
independent of those vested in Congress. Neither the judicial duty "to say
what the law is' 164 nor the scope of congressional power can be made to
hinge on the interests, knowledge or integrity of Congress. 16 History
teaches, and the Constitution contemplates, that public servants may not
execute their duties faithfully, responsibly, or diligently. 166 How ironic it
is that a majority of Congress, uninterested in exercising or defending its
powers, as contemplated by the doctrines of separation of powers and
checks and balances, would be rewarded for its irresponsibility, while a
minority, committed to both constitutionalism and constitutionally-
allocated institutional values, can find no relief, support, or protection
from the courts.
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It is true, as the courts have held, that Congress has resources to draw
upon in battle with the executive, among them the power of the purse, the
power to abolish programs and departments, investigatory authority, and
the ultimate weapon, impeachment of the President for encroachment on
its powers or for subversion of the Constitution. 168 But however
163 Id. at 1146; see also 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN
BASSETT MOORE 196 (1944) ("There can hardly be room for doubt that the framers of
the constitution, when they vested in the Congress the power to declare war, never
imagined that they were leaving it to the executive to use the military and naval forces of
the United States all over the world for the purpose of actually coercing other nations,
occupying their territory, and killing their soldiers and citizens, all according to his own
notions of the fitness of things, so long as he refrained from calling his action war or
persisted in calling it peace.").164 Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1151.
16' Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979).
166 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).167 Constitutional powers cannot be expanded or constricted by governmental
departments, but only through the amendment process. See generally THE FEDERALIST
No. 48, at 321 (James Madison) (Edward M. Earle ed. 1937) (explaining that since
"power is of an encroaching nature.., it ought to be effectively restrained from passing
the limits assigned to assigned to it"); Corwin, supra note 29, at 9 (arguing that it is a
necessary consequence of the separation of powers that "none of the departments may
abdicate its powers to either of the others"); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421
(1935).
168 The story of corruption in American politics is at least a thrice-told tale and requires
no review here. The word "Watergate" says is all. The Constitution speaks to various
government officials of the need for virtue in the exercise of their duties. Article II,
section 3 states that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
formidable these weapons may appear to be, they are difficult to
effectuate. 169 Moreover, they require majorities, and even a supermajority
in the event of impeachment, and thus would be unavailing to the
ineffectual minority that seeks judicial protection. 170 But should we really
prefer an inter-branch conflict, with knives drawn and tempers frayed, to
an impartial and dispassionate judicial resolution of competing
constitutional claims? 17 1 Is the nation well-served by a Court which sits
idly by in the face of a manifest constitutional violation?
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The Constitution was written not for Congress but for the American
people. 173 Presidential usurpation of power does not become more or less
legal as a result of congressional acquiescence or challenge. The
constitutionality of a presidential act is determined solely on the basis of
whether it enjoys constitutional warrant. Thus, judicial settlement of a
constitutional controversy between the President and members of
Congress, as in Dellums, does not constitute an intrusion into the business
of the House and Senate; it serves as a check on the President. It is not an
unwarranted interference in the affairs of Congress but an exercise of the
courts' duty to police constitutional boundaries. 174 As Chief Justice
Article I, section 2, clauses 1 and 5 provide that, "The House of Representatives ... shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment." Article I, section 3, clause 5 vests the Senate with
"the sole Power to try all Impeachments." Article II, section 4 sets forth impeachable
offenses.
169 Too many members of Congress, like too many other Americans, "tend to be
concerned with ends rather than means." Philip B. Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence,
1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 635. Kurland added, "Those who suggest a look at institutional
values as a method of protection against tyranny are scorned as being concerned with a
'literary theory' rather than facts." Id.
170 MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 319 (1990).
171 Id. Professor Michael Glennon finds "unpersuasive" the claim that "Congress has
enough arrows in its legislative quiver to respond successfully to executive illegality."
Glennon rightly notes the "practical problems that frequently render Congress' textbook
tools too unwieldly." Id. Chief among them is the ability of an administration to delay a
congressional investigation. See id. at 295-99. Dean Jesse Choper has said that of the
various tactics that Congress may employ against the executive, they "may reasonably be
viewed as both unseemly and undesirable." JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 286 (1980).
172 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.173 When Congress collided with President Andrew Johnson during the impeachment
process, Chief Justice Salmon Chase took the view that conflicting claims would have
been better resolved by the judiciary. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 300 (1973).
174 Professor Martin Redish justly stated, "The moral cost of such a result, both to society
in general and to the Supreme Court in particular, far outweighs whatever benefits are
thought to derive from the judicial abdication of the review function." Martin H. Redish,
Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031, 1060 (1984).
Professor Glennon has rightly asked, "Why is judicial inaction in the face of controversy
necessarily more prudent than judicial action?" GLENNON, supra note 164, at 318.
Raoul Berger powerfully stated the case for judicial resolution in stating, "The centrality
of the separation of powers to our democratic system and to the protection of individual
rights dictates that such injuries to a coordinate branch must be halted by the judiciary."
Edward White stated in 1912, in words that echo Marbury v. Madison, it
is the "ever present duty [of the courts] to enforce and uphold the
applicable provisions of the Constitution as to each and every exercise of
governmental power.'
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The duty of the Court to enforce the exclusive grant of authority to
Congress to initiate war is surely more vital and compelling than its
solemn responsibility to safeguard the sole power of Congress to
appropriate funds from the United States Treasury. 176 Who would excuse
a judicial invocation of the doctrines of ripeness and remedial discretion in
the face of a presidential usurpation of the appropriations power? The
constitutional measure of the exercise of each power is whether Congress
has acted affirmatively by voting. Congressional silence is not the
mechanism provided by the Constitution for the authorization of war or
appropriations. Whether Congress has taken that affirmative action is a
legal issue subject to resolution by the courts.
If a quiescent Congress bows to a usurpatious President, and if the
Court shirks its duty to say what the law is, what is left in the way of
governmental institutions to bring an errant executive to heel? Who,
indeed, will act to maintain the integrity of the Constitution?
II. Judicial Deference to the Executive
As we have seen, the Court has been willing, even eager, to
manipulate the Constitution and statutory law in order to justify executive
action in the realm of foreign affairs. The Court's reflexive use of law to
legitimate the international politics of the President, and its concomitant
BERGER, supra note 1, at 334 (1974). The eminent judge and legal scholar George
Wythe, who also served as Thomas Jefferson's mentor, wrote that the protection of one
branch of the legislative "against the usurpation of the other[s]," protects "the whole
community." Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (1782), quoted in BERGER,
supra note 1, at 334 n.144.
175 In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547-48 (1969), the Court emphasized the
"basic principles of our democratic system," and the right of the people to "choose whom
they please to govern them." For an excellent discussion of the founders' conception of a
constitution as a governing document that flows from the sovereignty of the people, see
generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(2d ed. 1992); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787 (1969).
176 A manifest correlative of the separation of powers was that no department of
government was granted authority to act in excess of its constitutional power. The courts
were authorized to check transgressions. See RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE
SUPREME COURT 8-16, 188-97 (1969). As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Marbury
v. Madison, "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?" 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
paralytic refusal to invoke its paramount prerogative of invalidation, have
served to exalt the President's authority in these matters above
constitutional norms.
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The judiciary's deference to the executive and its determination to
clothe the President with powers that are not tethered to the Constitution
evokes questions about its motives. Why has the judicial branch been so
loath to find usurpation of power? Why has it evinced no disposition to
frustrate the tremendous growth of power in the executive, especially in
the field of foreign relations? A complete explanation is beyond the reach
of this article. The explanatory factors adequate to such a task are like
pieces of a puzzle that cannot at this juncture be fitted properly. No more
is hoped for here than to succeed in placing most of the pieces on the
table.
It is likely that the Court views its function as supporting
governmental policy once it has been established. 178 Invariably, this
perspective translates into support for presidential conduct of U.S. foreign
relations. Certainly, any attempt to adduce an explanation would have to
include the Court's belief that the President has plenary powers in the area
of foreign policy that give him broad, discretionary authority to identify
and define national interests and national security. Second, the Court
claims that it lacks competence, expertise, equipment, and guidelines for
resolution of foreign affairs cases. Finally, the Court fears the
embarrassment, chaos, and confusion that may attend the exercise of
judicial power reversing a presidential act. These factors have coalesced to
make the judiciary an arm of the executive in the conduct of foreign
policy.
There can be little doubt that Curtiss-Wright has overwhelmed the
foreign relations law of the United States. 179 The Court's penchant for
precedent, however flimsy, drives it almost inexorably back to Curtiss-
Wright, the source of the view that the President exercises plenary
authority over foreign affairs. The effect of court-positivism has given this
case an oracular status that will not likely be diminished.
180
177 Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150 (1912).
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 states: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but
in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."
179 See the development of this theme in Arthur S. Miller, Reason of State and the
Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1980). Harold Koh has
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Indeed, from Belmont and Pink to Zemel and Haig, the Court has
regularly evinced its support of the President's dominant role.' 8 ' As an
attribute of his authority, the President has virtually unlimited discretion to
identify and define U.S. national security interests. As manifested in
Zemel and Haig, when the Court withdrew all checks on the executive's
power to regulate travel where national security interests are concerned,
the Court has shown an exaggerated deference to the President's
perception in this area. Of course, it is of no moment to the judiciary that
this sole organ doctrine has been savaged by constitutional scholars as
utterly without foundation and support in Anglo-American legal
history.'
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The Court's obeisance to the President cannot be explained solely in
terms of its subscription to the sole organ doctrine, however. Sixty years
ago, Professor Louis Jaffe was at pains to understand the Court's almost
"unreasoning sense of incompetency" in foreign relations cases. 183 This
sense of incompetency--which becomes, in the judges' minds, "no
competency"--should be considered in the broader context of the Court's
view that the President is superior in every aspect of policymaking
because of his alleged superior information, expertise, foreign relations
machinery, diplomatic skills, and better understanding of the national
interest. In short, the judges place more faith in the executive process of
weighing values and measuring the gains and losses of policies than they
do in the judicial process. This mindset of a lack of competency is evident
in a number of the cases that we have reviewed, ranging from Curtiss-
Wright (in which Justice Sutherland supported the President's lofty status
with the claim of superior information) to its unwillingness to rule on the
issue of unilateral presidential warmaking. 184 The Court's sense of
incompetency in foreign affairs is also reflected in the political question
doctrine, as exemplified by the test involving a lack of "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards."'
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Given this backdrop of the judiciary's insecurity in its competency and
the fact that the Court ordinarily can only check acts after they have
occurred, repeated judicial deference is somewhat more comprehensible.
As a result, there is something of an urge to "go along" with the
established policy. In reality, judicial deference provides a support
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function for the executive since Congress rarely acts first, and this act of
filial piety can work tragedy, as it did in the internment of Japanese-
Americans in World War II.
Finally, the Court recognizes the political realities of the international
realm. The contortions of Justice Rehnquist in Dames & Moore, stretching
and twisting to find congressional authorization for President Carter's
agreement with Iran, reflects his understanding of realpolitik and the
complexities of international negotiation. 186 If the Court had ruled against
the Iranian pact, chaos and confusion may have resulted and a carefully
crafted diplomatic package could have been unraveled. A similar fate
awaited President Roosevelt in both Belmont and Pink if the Court had not
contrived authority for the executive branch. Embarrassment is a weighty
concern for the Court, as are its desires to promote order and tranquillity
and avoid confusion and stress.
For all of these reasons, and perhaps others, the Court is inclined to
take a very narrow view of its role in foreign affairs cases. The reasoning
underlying this conception leads the Court to grant considerable respect,
latitude, and discretion to other departments, especially in foreign affairs
cases. In short, the Court believes it should not interfere with a President's
policymaking but instead should give him virtually untrammeled
authority. With this line of thought we have come full circle, for we have
returned to the argument of Curtiss- Wright.
III. Conclusion: Policing Constitutional Boundaries
The growth of executive foreign affairs powers in the past sixty years
has been tremendous. Although given only modest authority by the
Constitution, the President's powers have become so great as to provide
him with a virtual "monopoly" over foreign affairs.
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The judicial contribution to presidential hegemony is reprehensible.
Beginning with Curtiss-Wright, the courts have steadily fed the springs of
presidential power. 188 They have done so by showing great deference to
the executive, sometimes by virtue of the political question doctrine and
other times by blanket disregard of congressional intentions. Whatever the
method, the judiciary has played a pivotal role in the trend toward
executive domination of foreign affairs.
Its obeisance to the President betrays the wisdom of the deep-seated
suspicion with which the framers and ratifiers viewed executive
discretion, an animus so powerful that it led them, virtually without
116 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
187 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
188 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
dissent, to place the conduct of foreign policy beyond the presidency and
in the more trusted hands of Congress. That decision, of course, also
reflected their commitment to the republican principle of collective
decisionmaking, a process they believed would produce foreign policy
consistent with the national interests.
Acting as an arm of the executive branch, the Court has done much to
undermine collective decisionmaking and shared powers in foreign affairs
at the expense of its duty to police constitutional boundaries. As Justice
Robert Jackson said, "some arbiter is almost indispensable when power is
... balanced between different branches, as the legislative and executive.
• . Each unit cannot be left to judge the limits of its own powers."' 189 By
policing constitutional boundaries, the Court not only maintains the
integrity of the Constitution but also protects the entire political
community against usurpation. A political community like the United
States expects that the allocation of governmental power by the
Constitution will be maintained--barring, that is, fundamental changes
through the amendment process. Change through that method assures the
sovereign people a voice in the system by which they are governed. When
the written Constitution is violated by usurpation of power, the people
may wonder about the utility of limited powers "if these limits may, at
anytime, be passed by those intended to be restrained."' 90
John Marshall, speaking as a member of the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, had an answer. "To what quarter will you look for protection
from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to
the judiciary? There is no other body that can afford such a protection."' 191
In recent years, the judiciary has failed to provide protection against
executive usurpation of legislative power in foreign affairs; indeed, it has
sanctioned it. As a result, the doctrine of shared powers has been virtually
emasculated. If Marshall is right, then the Constitution and the Republic
are imperiled.
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